COMMENTARY

Summer 2009

by Hannes Swoboda / Jan Marinus Wiersma

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Michael Brzoska is right to deplore the lack of enthusiasm for arms control. We both share his concerns, particularly when it comes to the international community’s inability to strengthen significantly the non-proliferation treaty. The spread of nuclear arms technology is still one of the greatest threats to global peace. And the risk may be growing, because of the nuclear ambitions of states such as Iran and North Korea, but also because of a general revival of interest in nuclear power generation.

Every additional nuclear installation widens the potential security gap. If nuclear energy is to be an acceptable option for meeting our energy needs, proliferation and security issues need to be addressed, too. The change of administration in the United States represents a window of opportunity. President Obama has not merely announced he will make non-proliferation a central theme of his foreign policy, his intention is solidly based on the dynamism of the American debate on nuclear threats. The now-famous Wall Street Journal article in January 2007 by four of the Grand Old Men of American foreign and security policy – George Shultz, Bill Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn – was an unmistakable indication of the bi-partisan support that exists in the U.S. for a thorough review of America’s nuclear posture. Adoption of a ‘nuclear zero logic’ by the Obama Administration, as Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal labelled it in Foreign Affairs magazine, no longer seems unrealistic.

Ambition will not do the trick on its own. We need concrete and creative proposals with solid political backing to address security issues and the fragility of the NPT. The multilateralisation of the nuclear fuel cycle is one of the missing pieces in the non-proliferation puzzle. As Joseph Cirincione noted in his book “Bomb Scare”, a comprehensive non-proliferation solution must include the reform of the ownership and control of the means of producing fuel for nuclear reactors. In the wake of the EU’s December 2008 decision to support an IAEA nuclear fuel bank, which itself represents a significant step forward, the EU, together with the United States and Russia, should now develop fresh initiatives to bring all nuclear material under international control. Progress in this area would greatly help to ensure that the 2010 NPT Review Conference is a success.

To solve the non-proliferation puzzle, we also need to find the other missing pieces. They include re-thinking the role of nuclear arms in our security policies and reaffirming the ultimate goal of total disarmament. An extraordinary degree of responsibility rests on the shoulders of the recognized nuclear weapons states. Symbolic measures may help, so a formal announcement of a ‘no first use policy’ by nuclear-capable states would be very welcome. And the removal of the remaining tactical nuclear weapons on European soil along with the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would equally signal confidence in international agreements as the most effective way to counter nuclear proliferation. A moratorium on the deployment of new weapons systems in Europe would build greater trust between those partners whose agreement is indispensable if we are to achieve progress: the EU, Russia and the United States.

Following a high-level conference on non-proliferation that was organised in the European Parliament by the Socialist Group last December, we were able to conclude that a strong political momentum is developing around the issue. The window of opportunity is there, but will not be realised on its own. The Obama Administration needs to know that the European Union is fully on board to take the non-proliferation agenda forward. This means that the EU needs to move its ambition up a level and aim for a new global consensus on nuclear management and disarmament.