THE ARAB WORLD
We must not squander this historic opportunity for a peace deal
Autumn 2009
Although EU, U.S. and Arab approaches are different, Nawaf Tell believes that the positive signals being exchanged on a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict are unprecedented and must not be wasted
Three divergent approaches to peace in the Middle East were clearly expressed in July of this year. EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana stated that the “UN Security Council resolution should proclaim the adoption of the two-state solution” after a fixed deadline. Then, his statement was followed by a letter reportedly sent by President Barack Obama to a number of Arab countries’ national leaders asking them to take meaningful steps towards peace with Israel. And before the month was out, Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal went on record to say that “the core issue is an end to the occupation that began in 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state”. He then dismissed the confidence-building measures that had been suggested as no more than incidental.
These three different, though not necessarily contradictory, approaches come against the background of a rigid Israeli position on the issue of settlements in the West Bank and continuing provocations in East Jerusalem. Although all three approaches have the common goal of ending conflict between the Arab states and Israel, they differ in focus and on where the starting point should be. The European position is focused on the issue of statehood, the U.S. position focuses on broader regional peace and the Arab position centres on the end of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory.
In other words, the debate is so far focused on determining which platform should be used to launch negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis– Palestinian statehood, a wider regional peace or the end of occupation – with the chief differences being over the order in which these three components should be addressed.
The missing link in all these discussions is Israel, for it has become clear that as the fourth piece in the puzzle Israel has been taking an approach that is contradictory to the other three mainstream approaches. It is also clear that Israel has been sparing no effort to undermine through highly articulate time-buying techniques the more positive atmosphere that has been created by the arrival of the Obama Administration.
The Israeli government has yet to abide by its earlier ‘roadmap’ obligations to halt settlement activity, including natural growth, in the West Bank, even though this has increasingly become the cornerstone of Obama’s new U.S. policy. It’s an issue that was probably not intended to take up so much time and effort, and seemed chiefly aimed at building much-needed credibility for the U.S. in anticipation of the wider new Middle East peace effort. In any case, Israeli rejection has helped to solidify the U.S. position vis-à-vis the settlements issue, not least because it puts Washington’s credibility on the line.
The on-going settlements dispute is now raising serious questions about the peace credentials of the current Israeli government, and the extent to which it is even capable of delivering; and it’s also provoking speculation about the possible impact of any “appeasement” of this government on future peace prospects. Ever since Israel’s elections in February of this year and the formation of a coalition government that includes some extreme right-wing parties, few if any positive signals have come out of Tel Aviv to suggest a more positive atmosphere now resonates in Israeli politics. On the contrary, Israel’s Knesset has proposed a number of bills that are, to say the least, provocative both towards Jordan and to the Arab population in Israel.
The main question with regard to Arab states taking “meaningful” steps towards peace with Israel is with whom in Israel theses steps should be taken, and in exchange for what? Meaningful steps by Arab states should in any case be looked on as a reward for positive progress by Israel, whether as concrete actions on the ground or by contributing to an environment conducive to peace. But as there has clearly been no progress on the ground, nor even lip service towards the Palestinians, there is nothing to reward. Any premature appeasement of Israel’s current government would therefore constitute a severe blow to moderates in Israel and to their like-minded counterparts elsewhere in the Middle East. Rewards should be for deeds, and should aim at encouraging those who demonstrate they have the courage and political will that the situation calls for.
The Arab peace initiative of 2002 clearly defined the price of peace; it held out the prospect of normal relations in exchange for Israel’s full withdrawal, including East Jerusalem. For the Arab states, the initiative was a bold and courageous step in which, in the eyes of their publics, they would concede 78% of historic Palestine. The magnitude of this concession is yet to be appreciated, particularly by Israel. Nonetheless, and even with the Israel’s long silence on the initiative, in contractual terms, the initiative remains on offer. It is an invitation to negotiation that still awaits an answer.
Although this important Arab concession has been reiterated at all Arab summit conferences since 2002, it will not remain on the table indefinitely. This is not so much due to diplomatic manoeuvring on the part of the Arab states but rather Arab public opinion’s increasing intolerance of their governments’ moderation in the face of an increasingly extreme Israeli position. This obduracy is seriously weakening moderate forces in the region while strengthening the radical elements. The risk on both sides is that the radicals will be able to manipulate events and heighten the livelihood of the region being once again hijacked by outbreaks of violence.
The positive international signals of today are unprecedented in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but so too are the negative signals from Tel Aviv. To capitalise on what may well be a historic opportunity, we need the international mood to be strongly echoed in Israel. The conflict cannot be resolved on the Palestinian statehood issue alone, for there remains the legacy of human suffering caused by the territories’ occupation and the denial of Palestinian national aspirations. Only by addressing these basic issues will the region be able to enter a new era of peace and security for all its peoples. But to do that, the extremist and anti-peace activist on both sides of the fence must be confronted. Only in this way will the region overcome its shared problem, the plight of the Palestinians.