COMMENTARY

Autumn 2009

by Soeren Kern

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Camille Grand sees three possible reasons why President Nicolas Sarkozy decided to bring France back into NATO’s military command. The first is that with France fully re-integrated into NATO, Sarkozy will find it easier to develop a parallel European defence identity. The second is that as a full member of NATO, France will have greater influence over shaping its future, and the third is that Sarkozy will now be in a better position to “Europeanise” NATO.

Most analysts would probably agree with Grand’s appraisal. But can Sarkozy realistically achieve what he has set out to accomplish? As Grand points out, even as France moves closer to NATO, it has no intention whatsoever of abandoning ESDP. Last year’s French White Paper on Defence and Security was commissioned by Sarkozy and clearly states: “The European ambition stands as a priority. Making the European Union a major player in crisis management and international security is one of the central tenets of our security policy. France wants Europe to be equipped with the corresponding military and civilian capability.”

Sarkozy also repeatedly spelled out the French conditions for rejoining NATO: American acceptance of an independent European defence capability and a leading French role in NATO’s command structures. He reiterated these demands in a speech to the United States Congress, calling for “the alliance to evolve concurrently with the development and strengthening of a European defence.”

Some analysts have suggested that France’s rapprochement with NATO is a Trojan horse. They say Sarkozy wants to weaken the alliance from within so as to ease the way for an independent European defence free from American meddling. But even if his intentions vis-à-vis NATO are highly debatable, the more relevant question is whether Sarkozy’s policy move can strengthen European defence in any meaningful way.

On this point, Grand’s analysis comes up short. Like many analysts who desperately want Europe to play a greater role in international affairs, Grand paints a picture of ESDP that is far brighter than in true life. With ESDP marking its tenth anniversary, it is hard to see how anyone could be genuinely proud of what has been accomplished so far. The European Union has successfully organised some peacekeeping missions abroad, but ESDP has come nowhere near meeting the high expectations set for it when it was conceived in 1999. Nor can ESDP be seen as conferring on Europe anything like the superpower status so many European strategists crave.

With ESDP, as with NATO, Europe suffers from two essential weaknesses: a persistent lack of deployable hard-power defence capability, notably strategic airlift and sealift, and a debilitating lack of unity of purpose. For example, the EU is not even close to establishing the 60,000-strong Rapid Reaction Force that has been a “Headline Goal” for nearly a decade. The EU currently is having a hard time deploying even one Battlegroup of 1,500 troops, to be drawn from the same troops currently committed to NATO.

EU defence cooperation has not fared much better. Europe’s two biggest common defence projects, the A400M military cargo plane and the Eurofighter Typhoon, have been riddled with technical problems, cost overruns and disputes between the European partners. The long-term viability of both projects is in serious doubt.

In these times of severe economic downturn and rapidly shrinking defence budgets, Sarkozy will need a miracle if he hopes to take ESDP to the next level anytime soon. Until then, NATO, despite its many shortcomings, will continue to be indispensible for European and transatlantic security. So if Sarkozy is sincere about his newfound commitment to NATO, it’s the Atlantic alliance that will be the real winner.