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And then, of course, the applicant countries were concerned to have a
seat at the table and a voice that could exert some influence on
political and economic developments in Europe and beyond; for decades
they had been isolated and forced to accept decisions taken in Moscow.
But the change was at first less than democratic. In the early years
after democracy was restored, the countries of central and eastern
Europe found themselves exposed to the stern regulatory environment of
the EU’s internal market without any chance to influence the way it was
shaped or implemented.
Almost 20 years on, it is worth looking
at whether and how effectively these countries’ two principle accession
aims have been achieved. President Havel has often been criticised by
Czech politicians for "disputing" the idea that even during the years of
Soviet domination these countries were still a part of Europe.
The
reality is, though, that it was only during the 1990s that the formerly
communist countries regained their European heritage; Poland, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania and all the others are once
again part of Europe, belonging beyond any question at all to the same
family as Spain, Italy or Greece. The big question, then, is what
influence do the new EU members of this family have on the EU’s
political processes?
Influence in Brussels’ decision-making
could come only with accession, and even then a say in directing EU
affairs would only come gradually. But the key elements that would
determine the new candidate countries' political weight included their
democratisation record, their ability to comply with EU objectives,
including external policies, and the maturity of their own political
system.
The formerly communist candidate countries naturally had
to undergo an unprecedented democratisation process after 40 years of
rule from Moscow. For the rest of the EU this was a process that is not
only hard to understand but also defies assessment. The majority of
central and eastern European countries nevertheless achieved their
transformation goals, even if some of these achievements have proved
somewhat fragile. But they were in any case sufficient for accession to
the EU to go ahead, while also giving these countries a solid and
credible basis for building on.
It is also fair to point out
these criteria were never met by some of the older member states, and in
recent years we have also witnessed an erosion of EU solidarity and
heightened levels of national self-interest. The crises in EU politics
has become a reality, and so much so that some people in western Europe
were looking to central and eastern Europe in the hopes that their own
tired democracies would get fresh impetus from the lively new politics
of the newcomers. Sadly, this was true of the 1990s and is no longer the
case. The older member states have firmly established their influence
in various parts of the Union’s decision-making process, whereas the
newcomers have yet to establish themselves in a club that they do not
know and did not build.
Once the "big bang" enlargement had
become a fact, when in May 2004 the 10 new members increased the EU from
15 states to 25, with Bulgaria and Romania to bring that to 27 two
years later, the question being asked by the EU’s top officials was what
European policies might be expected from the newcomers, and which would
integrate the most easily. My own country, the Czech Republic, despite
the well-known euroscepticism of political leaders like Vaclav Klaus,
was expected to perform well.
But although, along with the other
candidates, we in the Czech Republic were eager to join the EU, very
little had been decided as to the policies to adopt once we were a full
member. There was a lack of clarity concerning the country’s vision, its
major interests within the EU and on strategy and priorities. There had
been little political or public discussion on these issues. So it came
as no surprise that many Czech politicians had little connection with
the EU and to this day still perceive the EU as being the “other side.”
The warnings by Vaclav Klaus that “we cannot influence anything in the
EU and we will melt like a sugar cube in a cup of coffee” have borne
fruit of a sort, for we Czechs can still hardly claim to have a
conceptually sound European policy, and in that we differ little from
the other new member states. This absence of a European policy has
worrying implications for the predictability and positioning of the
country, and thus for its influence within the wider EU structure. And
on top of this we as a nation share with the older member states a
propensity to blame the EU for anything and everything.
The last
few years have seen politics in Europe become more nationally focused
and pragmatic, responding all too readily to the whims of public opinion
as they ebb and flow. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that European
politics are now in crisis, and that being the case in the old EU, it
exacerbates the political fragility of the new member states.
At
the same time, it is a sad truth that both the Czech Republic and the
other new members failed to appoint their best people to EU-related
jobs. And given that the majority of older member states still send
their best negotiators to Brussels, this is a practice the new member
states can’t afford.
The combination of factors limiting the
newcomer countries’ influence in the EU is daunting but not disastrous.
It spans a lack of carefully prepared policies, sometimes antagonistic
attitudes towards the EU (not that the EU does not deserve constructive
criticism from time to time), weakly defined national interests, the
absence of a strategic approach and the lack of a truly European
mindset.
Are all these factors reason for pessimism? Not so much
pessimism, perhaps, but rather impatience. The new member states'
potential is being wasted. It is probably fair to say that they have not
met the expectations of many people, and that the heritage of 40 years
of isolation is proving heavier than anticipated.
On the other
hand, there is evidence that the new members are becoming better
equipped to cope with challenges and that their performance is
improving. The evidence for this was provided by the EU presidencies of
Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Neither of them were failures if
compared to the presidencies of older member states, and the Czechs
found themselves in the chair at a particularly difficult time. Not
everyone appreciated the Czechs’ style, and the controversial “Entropa”
installation by Czech artist David Černý in the entrance hall of the
Council of Ministers building certainly provoked irritation as well as
public attention. But the presidency nevertheless delivered in a number
of areas, particularly transport and energy.
Mistakes were made
too, of course. Many of them had their roots in the silly so-called
euroscepticism of certain Czech politicians that inevitably were aimed
in an open and competitive environment. But in general the Czechs
performed no worse than the EU Presidency average up until the moment
when domestic political calculation gained the upper hand over national
interests and the Presidency’s responsibilities. The downfall of the
government during its EU presidency caused by opportunistic opposition
politicians devalued many efforts of officials and even some of the
ministers.
Sadly, the flavour that remains is bitter. Yet the
Czech Republic’s EU Presidency provided the country and many of its
senior politicians with an important learning experience. There is now a
much better understanding of what the EU really is about, and what is
needed for any member state to have a say and at least exert some
influence. There is also a better sense of responsibility in EU matters.
The views of Vaclav Klaus are now without doubt in the minority, and
perhaps even an extreme minority at that. This became painfully clear
during the final stages of the Lisbon treaty saga. Czechs have learned
that although they may have had a disproportionatly large influence on
EU matters during the presidency, if they had less short-sighted
political leaders they might have generated even more political capitial
to be spent advantageously at a later date.
Yet the whole
experience clearly strengthened the country’s integration into the EU,
and there can be no doubt that the influence of the Czech Republic and
other new member states is significantly higher than before the
accession. That said, they have yet to exploit their full potential, and
that's to the detriment of themseves and the European Union as a whole. |