Recently, a well-known and highly respected Hungarian politician told me that he admires my centralist themes and national commitments, but still, my thinking may be „too Atlantic” for the taste buds of the Hungarian opposition (which is likely to form a new government in April). This sentence has been buzzing in the back of my head since. Am I some kind of a villain for co-mingling my support for the citizens’ movement and a „national” platform in Hungary with a sense of respect for U.S. policies? Is it really unrealistic to expect that newly liberated European nations have a peaceful cooperation with our large neighbor across the Atlantic? Or, can perhaps both these agendas be accomplished simultaneously?

This may be the greatest challenge for increasingly heterogenous European countries: unequivocally adhering to a narrow band of national interest or gradually opening their societies to a free flow of Atlantic ideas? But the choice does not have to be an „either, or” proposition. In fact, the two seemingly contraposed ways of thinking can live in harmony and most reasonably-minded policy experts now deem it necessary to find a common ground to mold the two opposing camps. This is particularly true for East-Central Europe, where the above cited contrast is most apparent.

What is the Atlantic idea?

For more than forty years, the security alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty symbolized the common interests of Western Europe and North America, and provided the context for all transatlantic political and economic relations. However, since the end of the Cold War, the changing international environment has raised questions about the actual depth of mutual interests between Europe and the United States. Together with the availability of new research materials, this has provoked a renewed investigation among historians into the whole concept of Atlantic partnership.

From the early 1960s onwards, the development of a stronger European voice within the Atlantic Alliance – both collectively via the EEC and individually from specific nations – caused many questions to be raised about the goal of an Atlantic Community. The ‘European Idea’ and the proposal for ‘two pillars’, based on a greater equality between the United States and Western Europe, was an attempt to get beyond the impression of the Atlantic Community as American hegemony. But was the Community concept flexible enough to absorb it? From Kennedy’s optimistic Trade Expansion Act to Kissinger’s ill-fated „Year of Europe” initiative, the United States attempted to accommodate and encompass a stronger European presence. Yet tensions among the European powers themselves over the future of Europe, particularly between Britain and France, also prevented a clear vision from emerging. Meanwhile global forces impacted on the passage of transatlantic cooperation. Economic difficulties spurred on by the 1973 oil crisis brought disappointments for those who thought the Hague summit of 1969 was the blueprint for a new leap forward in European integration. Ostpolitik and superpower detente revealed different perspectives on each side of the Atlantic concerning the future of East-West relations. The rise of new economic powers such as Japan brought a reconfiguring of ‘the West’ via an expanded OECD and the arrival of the Trilateral Commission.

Road blocks along the way

Serious road blocks developed to the synchronized opening of European societies and to the adoption of commmon values across Europe and the Atlantic. During the second half of the 20th century, some of these setbacks were Gaullism, crises in the Middle East, Eurocommunism and national chauvinism in Eastern Europe, mostly in Romania, Slovakia and Serbia. Another, more recent challenge was the split over the invasion of Iraq and the expansion of the EU into the Central and Eastern European satellite states (ex-Soviet) sphere of influence. The new member states of Europe – Slovakia in particular – reiterated their blindfolded national policies such as the new Slovak language law (which can easily be labelled as ethophobic, while seriously eroding minority rights) and arrogantly refused to adopt a more open, multi-cultural Atlantic way of thinking. Back to the middle ages, some would say, but Slovakia was able to push these ultranationalistic, anti-European legislation packages through both the Slovak and the EU Parliaments in Brussels, with the tailwind of an economy that has been doing reasonably well as western investors were flocking into Slovakia in recent years.

Hungary is different. The country has been governed by a socialist-liberal coalition with a strong international disposition for 8 years. Some say it has been a catastrophic 8 years. The socialists sang the „socialist international” at party conventions to reinvoke bad memories of a failed dictatorship, while the liberals ambitioned to sell any national assets that they could get their hands on.

Their blindfolded, upper handed approach debilitated the Hungarian economy to new lows as national debt skyrocketed. An overtaxed work force was bitter as they were constantly being accused of not generating enough revenues for the state. Freeloaders, socialist and liberal party clans, and greedy business circles co-opted to drive the economy to the brink. Decent hard work was not appreciated and the highest tax burden in Europe destroyed the small and medium-size enterpreneurial spirit. A new beginning may ensue in April as the opposition is ready to take over. Some of the national debt that was compiled in recent years should be excused as, similar to the Greek example, it would be in Europe’s interest to bring Hungary back to its feet.

Hungary also has a legitimate agenda to redress the Trianon „Peace Accords”, which was more of a totalitarian pact to punish the losing side after WWI. Possible compensatory damages could be requested by Hungary in due time, which lost 2/3 of its territory and millions of its national citizenry to hostile surrounding countries (Slovakia, Romania, Serbia and the Ukraine in particular). This major injustice committed to a single European nation has not been properly addressed at major international forums since.

Constructing the „Atlantic bridge”, while being painstakingly careful not to burn up any of the „national bridges” to the past

However, all national policymakers in these countries need to reevaluate and move closer to Atlantic cooperation based on common U.S.-European goals. Free trade, free movement of people, goods and ideas are not to be compromised by national dictates and inward national thinking.

Finally, whether it is national or Atlantic policies that prevail (my preference is that they make peace with each other), in all cases, it should be reiterated that extremism and racism should be stemmed out entirely. For the simple reason that it assaults human intelligence and reason.

International bankers, speculators, and finance magnets should be beware though: the nations of Europe and the people of the United States will no longer tolerate excesses that brought about the recent economic depression worldwide. Serious checks and balances need to be installed to contain financial greed and speculation. The good old traditional work ethic that made western societies prosper for over 150 years need to be re-introduced and legislative guarantees need to be installed to enforce ethical business behavior and to create win-win scenarios for rapprochement, i.e. intermingle national ambitions with the overreaching idea of Atlantic cooperation.