The title implies that some Central European countries - read Czech Republic and Poland - have been mostly concerned about bilateral US-led missile defence project at expense of neglecting their commitments as NATO members. In my view such contradiction is artificially construed and it is based on false perceptions that do not correspond to reality. Let me first analyse whether and how Central Europeans enhance NATO's capacity to operate militarily out of area by contributing to peace support operations and then consider recent developments concerning missile defence in Europe.
Central Europeans in foreign missions.
As of early 1990s Central European countries did not want to be seen as pure 'consumers' of security. Even before their candidacy to NATO they contributed to international peacekeeping and then to NATO-led stabilization missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, Czechoslovakia joined the coalition of 26 nations in “Operation Desert Storm" in 1991.
In 1992 Czechoslovak infantry battalion was assigned to the UNPROFOR peacekeeping mission in former Yugoslavia; it should be noted that this joint Czech and Slovak battalion kept operating beyond a break-up of Czechoslovakia. Since 1996 the Czech Republic contributed a battalion-sized unit for NATO-led multinational forces.
The Czech soldiers participated in IFOR and SFOR missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, KFOR in Kosovo, AFOR in Albania, and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).
After their accession to NATO the new members continued to behave like responsible 'contributors' to security of Europe. Already during Kosovo campaign Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic took their commitments to NATO not less seriously than other members of the club. New members of NATO accepted their commitments to a common security of the Allies while seeking protection and assurance from other Allies. Contrary to sceptical expectations that new members would free-ride after accession to the Alliance, they kept contributing to joint NATO missions. According to all accounts new members have provided a fair share in terms of their participation in foreign missions.
Military contributions can be measured by inputs - average numbers of troops in foreign missions (NATO-led as well as other) or by outputs - financial resources allocated those missions. In general, few allies (both new and old ones) have kept their promises regarding overall defence budget adjustments to 2 per cent of GDP.
Based on country's comparable size and population, military contributions by Hungary and the Czech Republic are usually compared to those of Belgium or Portugal, Poland's contribution is compared to Spain. In 2008 Poland deployed to foreign missions more than 4400 troops (compared to 5200 of Spain), the Czech Republic and Hungary deployed each on average more than one thousand personnel. Portugal's contribution varied between 600 to 1200 troops in recent years, Belgium's contribution on average 1200 troops. In terms of qualitative contribution it can be argued that because of 'national caveats' of some Alliance members in Afghanistan new members perform quite well even in high intensity fighting. They have shared the burden the same way as 'older' NATO members of similar size.
Missile Defence in Europe
In previous years it seemed that participation in the missile defence was a top security policy priority for Czech and Polish governments that invested a lot of political efforts in the project implementation. Czechs and Poles have been taken aback by the recent turn of the US policy. Last September, the US government changed plans of previous administration to build third site of ballistic missile defence system in Poland and Czech Republic. The original plan to deploy X-band radar in the Czech Republic and dozen of interceptors in Poland addressed more concerns about individual long-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East - which is a threat considered to mature in longer-term. A current plan presents a more flexible project (Phased Adaptive Approach) designed to face challenges of short and middle-range missiles to the Alliance's Southeastern flank – which is clearly a more acute threat. A modified plan has increased the potential role of other European Allies in building missile defence for and in Europe. For example, Romania will now take part in a newly revamped defence shield.
Why has been a missile defence project embraced so enthusiastically by Czechs and Poles? From the beginning of bilateral consultations and negotiations Poland and the Czech Republic performed as responsible US allies in the region. They understood the project as an opportunity to address threats and challenges emanating from the Middle East region and materialization of their alliance commitments. Admittedly the threat was not perceived as particularly acute in Central Europe, but its geographical location played a significant role because of anticipated missile trajectories. The plan clearly reflected security concerns of the US and was seen as a contribution to indivisible security of the whole Alliance. Neither Czechs nor Poles have understood missile defence projects as undermining NATO's cohesion. Quite to the contrary: member states are expected to "separately and jointly…maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack" (Article III of the Washington Treaty). Although some Europeans suspected Czechs and Poles of striving for exclusive bilateral relations with the US, the project of a 'third site' has been always understood as the first step towards a broader NATO system protecting Europe.
Missile defence project has been mentioned in several NATO declarations since Prague Summit in 2002. In Prague, NATO initiated a feasibility study "to examine options for protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centres against the full range of missile threats." In 2006, NATO summit in Riga "tasked continued work on the political and military implications of missile defence for the Alliance including an update on missile threat developments." In 2008, the Alliance at the summit in Bucharest recognized the missile defence as a response to ballistic missile threat. NATO recognized "the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets." The US 'third site' was envisaged to become "an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defence architecture." In 2009, at summit in Strasbourg/Kehl NATO not only reaffirmed previous commitments, but endorsed a potential development of 'Theatre Missile Defence' (ALTBMD) into NATO's territorial missile defence as well as its potential linking with the US and Russian missile defence systems "at an appropriate time".
Let me be clear. If there is any worry in Central Europe it is not about a missile shield. NATO has transformed itself into relevant security provider outside of its territory. As shown above it has been done with an equitable contribution by new members. However, NATO has not matched their expectations regarding its core defence function. It is time to provide them with elements of assurance regarding territorial defence – namely contingency planning, joint exercises, and a support defence infrastructure, hopefully including a NATO-anchored missile defence system in a near future.
Jiří Schneider is the Program Director of the Prague Security Studies Institute.
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