By Hichem Karoui
The Gulf Today, July 03, 2010
Several Western and Arab observers share the views concerning the current evolution in the region of North Africa, especially regarding the connection between Islam and the problems of political and economic development.
There is an acknowledgment, for example, that “the rise of unemployment and frustrations of all kinds, feeding the extensive powerful Islamist movements, have relatively undermined the stability of regimes known for their long stability.” The “state of disarray” of the Maghreb countries encourages all forms of Islamic radicalism.
The only exception is perhaps Morocco with its relative longer tradition in multipartite politics. Since the death of Hassan II, Rabat endeavoured to turn a page of the country’s history called “leaden years” (1962-1998), referring to the frequent violations of human rights. There is indeed some progress made since: release of opinion prisoners, creation of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission to repair the damages of the past, review of the Family Code, relatively more credible elections, etc…
But at the same time, successive governments in Algeria justified their inertia by the “Islamist threat.” As for the Tunisian authorities, similar reasons still oppose the aspirations for greater democracy … And despite Libya would like to seem more credible with its populist system, it has actually not prevented the emergence of a violent radical opposition.
Meanwhile, neither the Algerian inertia nor the much muscled Tunisian and Libyan autocracies reduced really the potential reach of Islamic radicalism, if we recall recent violent clashes opposing the authorities and cells of Al Qaeda in the Arab Maghreb. Such policies are then doomed.
Indeed, it seems that the times of “stability” under the umbrella of “strong regimes” are gone. The activation of AFRICOM through recent programmes of surveillance and joint operations suggests that any US current or future policy would have to deal with a region where the elements of destabilisation are varied and numerous.”
The future of this region may be threatened on two levels: Internally, by the dangers hovering over its apparent political stability, because of the democratic deficit. And regionally, through old unresolved conflicts (more particularly the question of the Sahara) and new radicalist networks (especially Al Qaeda) moving more or less unrestrainedly, across the region (south Maghreb and sub-Sahara).
Observe that the Maghreb states have all had respectively with their neighbours border conflicts: sands war between Algeria and Morocco in 1963; a belated recognition of Mauritania in Morocco in September 1969; Western Sahara conflict since 1975; Tunisian-Libyan conflict over “Al Jurf Al Qari.” Etc… These problems still exert an occult influence although some have been resolved. Yet, in the practices of the statesmen, some of these conflicts, along with unacknowledged rivalries and untold resentments, represent a “dead weight” on their dealings and a real denial to the mistrusted Union of the Maghreb.
The conditions for the emergence and the rise of Islamism are approximately the same for all those countries, namely: social deprivation and misery, urban demographic explosion and the difficulties of daily life, identity crisis, unemployment, etc…
In this sad decor, Algeria still occupies a special position, mainly because of its tradition of violence.
Algeria’s central position — since the independence — in the American plans has been noticed by several observers. Indeed, we can go back as far as February 1963, when president JF Kennedy stressed that the interests of the United States are the primary factor in the new stance regarding a country (Algeria) “which is the key to North Africa.” And he added: “Our main concern is the increase of our own influence in Algeria.” So, it was not Tunisia, not even Morocco… But Algeria the “catch,” the US primary concern. And one can certainly understand the reason just on a simple look at the map.
Since then, the exchanges of visits between US and Algerian officials as well as the involvement of the Algerian army in Nato naval exercises in the Mediterranean, tend to prove America’s willingness to integrate the country in the alliance’s strategy, possibly giving him a lead role in the Maghreb, and by extension in the Mediterranean.
Nevertheless September 11, 2001, might have engendered unintended consequences, which encouraged the Americans to readjust their strategy and adapt it to the recommendations of Paul Kennedy related to the pivot state thesis where Algeria would be included as an important element of the US strategy.
For some observers, although Algeria has been the latest southern country to join Nato’s Mediterranean Dialogue after the crisis of civil war that has devastated the country over a decade, she is propelled today to the forefront to serve US strategic goals in which energy security is crucial. This is, no doubt, a great programme, which is reminiscent in some of its aspects of the cooperation between the US and the Gulf region. This trend may be confirmed by the statement made by President Bouteflika, during a joint conference with Lord Robertson, Secretary General of Nato in Brussels: “Our dialogue with Nato is a strategic option,” had he said.
But despite its energetic importance, Algeria suffers from the same ills of all under-developed States. Unlike the successful economic and financial development that may be observed in the GCC, Algerian oil and gas were hardly used to ensure economic development. The State dirigisme that controlled this sector for so many years has not only justified the indulgence of a rich indolent class in easy and artificial comfort, but it gave the impression of being disconnected from the economy and benefiting from an autonomy granting it the status of a “state within the state.”
In addition, it maintained a bloated and parasitic clientelism, contributed to the inefficiency of the public sector and to the inflation of a burdensome bureaucracy. Thus, besides being an obstacle to the development and the social cohesion, the hydrocarbon sector, generating significant resources, exempted the State of the necessary managerial discipline allowing it to avoid the constraints regarding the obligation of results so decisive for any democratic electoral system.
To sum it up, the situation of these States today is not really pinky. The worse scenarios are expected if the current political slump is allowed to go on unchanged. And the first victims of such a situation are young people that continue to throw themselves into the sea trying to reach European shores and ending up sometimes shipwrecked.
One feels sorry about all those lost lives indeed. It is as if every reported sinking of those illegal boats was the shipwreck of the Arab Maghreb Union, born-dead since twenty years.