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By: Hichem Karoui, Just a few days before Netanyahu’s last visit to the White House, the
Washington Post (June 25) run a story about Shimon Peres urging the
United States and other world powers to engage with Hamas in order to
persuade the hardliner group to renounce violence and prepare for peace
with Israel. As the Obama administration was preparing to receive the
Israeli Prime Minister, the influential magazine Foreign Policy (July 4)
run an opinion by Michele Dunne (Editor of Carnegie’s Arab Reform
Bulletin), in which she suggests that if Washington does not need at
this point to engage directly Hamas, it can do it indirectly. Dunne
contends that the only way out of the stalemate is to encourage the
reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas instead of impeding it, and to
make of it the basis to “broker a power-sharing arrangement,” without
which any further negotiations about an Israeli-Palestinian peace would
be pipedream.
Indeed. Any attentive observer knows that even
weakened by the blockade Hamas can still hamper peace efforts. But at
this time, Peres’s suggestion may be hard to achieve. Instead, the
suggestion of indirect action as a way of preparing all the parties to
tackle new givens, is more practical, for we know that dealing with this
issue implies a disposition in Israel and the United States to change
their stance regarding Hamas, so far considered “terrorist.”
On
the one hand, encouraging Palestinian reconciliation may have the best
consequences, if it is officially supported in the US. All the
Palestinians will understand it as a message of good will. On the other
hand, it may pave the way to help a best understanding in the US
Congress of what is at stake in the Middle East.
Should the
status of Hamas be “upgraded” from a FTO (foreign terrorist
organisation) to that of respectable political actor, as it had been for
the PLO? Any US official endorsement of the Palestinian national
reconciliation should have to answer this question.
So far, the
first obstacle is the resistance among the US leaders to the idea of
talking directly with Hamas. The second obstacle is Hamas’s reluctance
to accept the logic of mutual concessions and compromise as a valuable
political means to achieve the goal of an independent Palestinian state,
which implies mutual recognition and respect.
In this context,
we have two observations:
1- Hamas is identified in the US as a
terrorist group, although its military wing has never operated outside
the area of Israel and the Palestinian territories. Indeed, though
September 11 has revealed the existence of multiple interpretations of
Islam (some violently radical) and the active participation of key
hardliner terrorist cells in the West, we can hardly say that Hamas fits
into this picture.
International networks have played an
important role in the phenomenon called “Islamic sahwa” in recent years,
and consequently in the growth of religious extremism. They may be
humanitarian or financial networks of the Muslim diaspora. These
networks are build upon affinities and bonds of class, ethnic groups,
countries, tribes, families, clans, as well as on the basis of the
perception of injustice that inhibits acculturation and leads
individuals sometimes onto the path of violence.
As far as we
know, Hamas is not active in these networks, as it conceives its fight
as local (its principal problem is with Israel not with the
international arena) rather than international. On this level, it
represents zero threat.
We also know that the support networks
in European countries have played a key role in financing terrorist
operations on an international level. As revealed the investigations
after Sept.11, Muslim diasporas in countries like Germany, Great
Britain, France, Spain, Belgium and Switzerland have been involved, if
not in direct dealing with Al Qaeda, at least in the recruitment of
would-be terrorists.
But some observers warn that Al Qaeda is
not the only organisation that recruits in the Muslim diaspora.
Hizbullah and Hamas (both on the blacklist of terrorist organisations)
do the same thing. Are also cited in this wake some Islamic charitable
and humanitarian organisations allegedly serving as a smokescreen for
radical activism. Moreover, globalisation facilitated these activities:
the networks have expanded. They span the globe, wherever there is a
Muslim diaspora.
The US State Department has identified in this
context the border region lying between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay
as a focal point of Islamic extremism in Latin America. Similarly, the
Chechen rebels, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the united Tadjik
opposition, and Hizb Al Tahrir have used the system of some
organisations for aid and support to generate funds for their own
activities.
The economic and financial networks have generated
considerable debate and focused the attention on the system of
self-financing, and money-laundering. Some surveys have found for
example that members of extremist networks in Western countries can
finance their activities from an entirely legal and regular work. We
also know that Al Qaeda itself has invested in various business
operations in Sudan or elsewhere in the world. Al Qaeda might have
greatly benefited from the illegal trade in African gold and diamonds on
the black market, it seems.
Nonetheless, all this is not
connected to Hamas's activities. Recruitment of non-Palestinians for its
operations inside Israel and the Palestinian territories is unlikely
and unproved. Yet, even if the US Congress can face these givens,
another difficulty remains however. It is the second point.
2-
Hamas ideology is the main problem the organisation would confront on
the assumption that it is ready to exchange concessions. Hamas is
representative of the classic Islamist ideology acting for a Sharia
ruled state. Yet, this wouldn't be a problem if the leaders accept to
give their organisation an orientation similar to the Turkish AKP.
Israel and the US have diplomatic relations with Turkey, and maybe this
country could eventually serve as intermediary, if ever such prospects
of negotiations are serious.
So, will they talk? Maybe
Palestinian reconciliation is first and foremost needed at this stage.
The rest is dependent on conjuncture. Courtesy: The Gulf Today (U.A.E), July 17, 2010
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