Arguably the most important reason for the international interest in
Iran is its strategically pivotal geography. Like some of its Muslim
neighbours, it has tremendous oil and gas reserves. For the United
States, the revolution in Iran was nothing less than a geopolitical
shock.
Revolutionary dynamics in the Arab World have recently rekindled the
debate in the West on “political Islam”. To get a good understanding of
the phenomenon, however, it is necessary to define it properly – which,
so far, has hardly been done.
The issue is generally approached from two directions. The
cultural-essentialist or Orientalistic school holds that Islam
determines political, economic and social realities. Orientalists argue
that the entire Muslim world is not only somehow monolithic, but even
downright resistant to change. Samuel Huntington’s book “The clash of
civilizations” is a prominent expression of such thinking. This school
is not alone in emphasising religion as the single most important
defining feature of society, Islamist fundamentalists say so too.
The competing school emphasises structural aspects that have evolved in
history. Its analyses take a wide range of factors into account, namely
socio-economic conditions, political trends, historical change, class
conflict and revolutions.
The current Arab Spring has dealt the Orientalist school a severe blow,
and may yet discredit it once and for all. Obviously, there is a
widespread desire in Muslim societies for change, and the revolutionary
motivation is not primarily rooted in faith. Rather, the desire for
universal freedoms and social justice is making itself heard in Tunisia,
Egypt and elsewhere.
The books about Iran discussed here do not belong to the Orientalist
camp. Nonetheless, each author assesses the topic from a different
angle.
Struggle for democracy
In “Iran: a people interrupted” (2007), Hamid Dabashi analyses nearly
200 years of history from the literary-intellectual and political
perspectives. The author takes his readers on a trip through time,
revisiting major historical events. With unparalleled eloquence, he
argues that Iranians have been fighting for democracy and against
“foreign and domestic tyranny” for more than a century. Dabashi says the
anti-colonial Tobacco Revolt at the end of the 19th century, the
Constitutional Revolution at the beginning of the 20th, the
nationalisation of the oil sector under Prime Minister Mohammad
Mossadegh in the 1950s and the “Islamic Revolution” at the end of the
1970s were the most important steps in this process.
He disagrees with the notion of Iran being caught between tradition and
modernity, calling it a “fabricated paradox”. Instead, he argues that
since the 19th century an “anti-colonial modernity” marked by the
struggle against both domestic and foreign oppression has defined
Iranians’ emancipatory experience.
Dabashi traces three major ideological formations back to the
multicultural, pluralistic Constitutional Revolution of the early 20th
century: liberal-democratic nationalism, social-democratic socialism and
theocratic Islamism. In his view, these three ideological formations do
not necessarily clash. Rather, they all have their roots in the
anti-colonial struggle and serve as catalysts for one other.
In the early 20th century, the idea of the modern nation-state with the
notion of citizenship took shape, including both women and religious
minorities, with relevant roles for a free press and intellectuals.
However, it was never fully realised because of the repression of a
series of Shah regimes which were allied to colonial and imperial
powers. These ideals have yet to materialise.
Dabashi sees Shia Islam as inherently oppositional in its political
focus. Accordingly, a dilemma arises when Shia clerics assume state
power and get corrupted by it – which is what happened in the Islamic
Republic.
Dabashi assesses the role of Shia religious leaders in the context of
Iran’s political development. He makes a distinction between progressive
clerics who oppose unjust rule and conservative ones who are closely
connected to power or strive for it. In doing so, he shows that Shia
clerics in Iran do not form a monolithic block. As is evident today,
some important leaders sympathise with the democracy movement, and many
are not pleased with the increasingly militaristic system that was set
up in the name of religion.
A wide range of voices
In “Iran’s influence: a religious-political state and society in its
region” (2010), Elaheh Rostami-Povey quotes a wide range of contemporary
voices – journalists, refugees, expatriates and researchers from Iran,
Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt. She conducted her interviews with
Muslim modernists, secular leftists, nationalists and feminists from
2007 to 2009. She shows that all of them demand democracy and liberty.
Her book is an encyclopaedic discussion of the political dynamics within
the religious-political state of Iran. She shows that its internal
contradictions have fostered the growth of a new democratic movement,
which calls the regime, but not religion as such, into question.
At the same time, she demonstrates why the Iranian state’s foreign
policy has found approval in the region where a majority of the public
identifies with Iran’s stance against the USA, Israel and the “war on
terror”. One reason for the popularity of criticism voiced by Tehran is
that many Arab autocracies cooperate with Washington, and open debate
has been impossible so far.
Rostami-Povey emphasises the wide range of manifestations of “political
Islam”, each of which has to be considered in its specific historical
and socio-political context. She writes that Islamists in Iran,
Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its associated
organisations or Hamas in Palestine are all quite different, and all
are struggling with their own internal contradictions. However, all
varieties of Islamism have one thing in common: they mobilise popular
support by opposing imperialism and Zionism.
Rostami-Povey warns that the term “Islamic fundamentalism” prevents us
from seeing the diversity of various Islamisms. As she puts it,
“homogenisation and essentialism” make us blind to dynamics of change
and thus promote Orientalism and Islamophobia. She argues that,
ultimately, the West’s ongoing hostility towards Iran and Islamist
movements only strengthens those conservative forces.
Arshin Adib-Moghaddam comes to similar conclusions in “Iran in world
politics: the question of the Islamic Republic” (2007). He has worked up
an intricate theory on the interaction between society, culture and
state institutions. As he puts it, “counter-hegemonic utopias” – such as
Marxism, Communism, Maoism and Islamism – radically changed Iran’s
political culture in the 1960s. The revolution therefore pursued
“utopian-romantic” ideals, which left their mark on the Islamic
Republic’s institutionalised norms and still affect its approach to
foreign policy.
He emphasises the constant possibility of change in the Islamic Republic
as a result of an “active counterculture”. He shows that the picture US
neo-conservatives paint of Iran is perverted and calls for “critical
Iranian studies” which would pluralise the ways one sees Iran and
dissect the international politics surrounding the country.
These three books by noted scholars lay the foundation for a better
understanding of Iran and “political Islam”. They theoretically and
empirically assess the context in its entire complexity. Without such
comprehensive knowledge, Western understanding cannot add up to more
than biased knee-jerk reactions. The books show that political trends do
not come about in a vacuum, but rather are rooted in complex settings
with domestic and foreign social, economic and political factors. The
idea of a “monolithic Islam” is not only wrong – it is dangerous.
Ali Fathollah-Nejad is a political scientist. He is preparing his PhD
thesis on Iran’s role in a changing world order at London’s School of
Oriental and African Studies and the University of Münster in Germany.
»» info@fathollah-nejad.com
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