Seven months of rebellion in Syria has left more than 3,000 civilians dead, according to the United Nations. In response Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have recalled their ambassadors from Damascus (Qatar having done so in July) and are demanding at the same time an end to repression of the Syrian populace and democratic reforms.
This action, effectively representing a collective position of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – led by Saudi Arabia - is a crucial political turning point. Saudi Arabia is not only the political giant of the Gulf but the guardian of Islamic holy sites, and as such the traditional opinion leader in the region. However, the GCC has not formally outlined a common strategy, its member countries seeming to be torn between the opportunity to encourage change, especially in relation to Iran, and the desire to maintain the status quo to not only ensure their individual survival but the collective integrity of the Cooperation Council. The GCC appears, therefore, to be considering all its options before becoming involved in the crisis, from regime change to maintaining the Syrian political order as it is now through political pressure or expediency. Despite being a regional forum bringing together diverse interests and positions, the GCC and Saudi Arabia, in particular, seem to be using the Syria crisis for their own interests and thus contributing to redefine the future strategic balance in the Middle East.
The growing political activism and diplomatic engagement of the GCC has already been demonstrated, albeit with some differences, in the crises in Libya, Bahrain and Yemen. It acted to quell the protests in Yemen and Bahrain, but in Libya seems to have, in a sense, supported the so-called rebellion. In the case of Syria, it has expressed lately weak but significant condemnation of the ongoing violence. In a joint statement on August 7, 2011 the GCC condemned the crackdown and called on the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, “to adopt serious reforms, guaranteeing full civil rights … and the dignity of the Syrian people.”
In the days following this statement, and more recently, the Syrian army actually conducted several bouts of extremely violent repression against the civilian population in the cities of Hama (Central Syria) and Dayr az-Zor (East), major centers of Sunni protest. The speech subsequently made by King Abdullah, on behalf of the GCC, against Damascus made very clear that “the Syrian leadership must act wisely and implement reforms, as has been promised,” otherwise it will see “a future of chaos and loss.” The Arab League also seems to have awakened from its silence on the Syrian issue. Through its Secretary, Nabil al-Arabi, it issued a statement to the pan-Arab daily Al-Hayat on October 27, which expressed its “deep concern and growing anxiety over the deteriorating security situation in Syria resulting from the heightened violence and military operations being carried out in Hama, Dayr az-Zor, and in other regions of the country.” The Arab foreign ministers also denounced the repression perpetrated by the Syrian security forces and called on Bashar al-Assad to protect Syrian citizens.
Despite the obvious differences of interest between member states of the GCC, it is conceivable that these Sunni Arab countries, fully aware that something needs to be done without resorting to the use of weapons, have decided to stir things up, probably because the U.S. is involved. Both the United States and various countries of the Arabian Peninsula know quite well that economic retaliation against Syria could be a successful strategy and bring the desired results.
The GCC’s interests
The fall of the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes has created a domino effect throughout the Middle East, especially the countries of the Gulf region, Bahrain in particular, and to a lesser degree Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman. The region’s monarchies, although united in the GCC – created as an economic and military umbrella in May 1981 to counteract the regional influence of Iran – do not form a monolithic block, as each has a unique position. While nurturing certain common interests, the various countries conduct independent foreign policies which sometimes conflict with the collective interest. Saudi Arabia is the largest and most influential member, and naturally it is gravely concerned about what is happening in the region and seeks to curb the revolutionary tendencies, which might have dangerous repercussions at home. One of the containment strategies adopted by Riyadh has been to use religion and the economy to “buy” the obedience of its people. Considering the highly unstable internal political situation in many neighboring countries and the equally fragile regional context, the al-Saud monarchy has found it instrumental to use political and economic means to conclude bilateral trade agreements with states of the Persian Gulf. The purpose is to appease protests and provide employment opportunities, which in turn help bring about much needed economic development on the Arabic Peninsula and the Levant.
Before the riots Riyadh was engaged in 22 economic cooperation projects with Damascus, mainly in the fields of agriculture, industry, transport and healthcare, worth tens of millions of dollars. Damascus has already been extended approximately $100 million in loans by the Saudi Fund for Development (SFD). Damascus is thus being provided with economic assistance in exchange for internal and regional stability. Kuwait, another regional player also rocked by protests deriving from a national economic crisis, has adopted similar tactics. Emir al-Sabah has offered Syria, through the transnational Arab Development Fund (ADF), more than $50 million in loans and other assistance in exchange for an end to the repression and the gradual establishment of a true transition to democracy. The Emir is also seeking to calm the tide of Kuwaiti public opinion with this move, as Kuwaitis feel a strong solidarity with the Syrian people demonstrated in the protests against the Syrian regime’s actions by a wide range of Kuwaiti activists, including members of the national parliament.
Two other members of the GCC, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, are on the same wavelength, although tuned in with a slightly different set of dials. The two Gulf emirates, despite having taken different positions from the Saudis (for example, the withdrawal of the Qatar ambassador in Damascus had already happened in July, while the UAE ambassador is still remaining in Syria), cannot run the risk of facing revolutionary “contagion” spreading on their own territories and, therefore, they act with considerable forethought in the countries of the Mashreg. The two Gulf emirates’ enormous wealth and vast network of political and diplomatic contacts have mainly helped them mitigate the repercussions of the popular riots now shaking the region and, in particular, nearby Bahrain.
UAE and Qatar’s largesse, however, excposes these two counties to frictions with Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two regional giants. Therefore, their recent actions can only be explained by their need to safeguarfd their own interests. In order to discourage further revolutionary activity and bring about peace and financial stability in the larger region, the two countries could offer Syria the opportunity to benefit from rich contracts and economic partnerships. For instance, Majid al Futtaim, a wealthy businessman from the UAE, announced at the end of August that he intended to invest over $1 billion in strategic sectors of the Syrian economy, including the hotel, banking and infrastructure sectors and possibly others. Similarly, Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, the ruling Emir of the State of Qatar since 1995, stated during a state visit to Iran (Qatar is the only GCC member with stable relations with Tehran) on August 25 that the country would make an investment in Syria through the Qatar Development Bank (QDB), the leading national investment group, in exchange for an end to the violence directed against the civilian population.
Oman has a somewhat different position. Following the riots that began in last February in the country, almost simultaneous with those in Bahrain, it has openly sided with the Syrian people while neither quarreling with nor opposing the Alawite regime. Although Oman does not have the same economic power of other GCC member states, it can influence relations with Iran and play a strategically important role in any future sectarian confrontation, however hypothetical these may be at present.
This apparent balancing act is part of a larger strategy. Oman wants to demonstrate to regional players and the world that it has a pragmatic policy aimed at preserving, as far as possible, the status quo in order to prevent Iranian politics from impacting its own, a concern shared by Qatar and the UAE. It is only natural that all GCC countries are concerned about the possible fallout from the situation in Syria and understand its ramifications for both their internal and regional stability. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait seem to be tacitly advocating regime change in Syria, using economic means in order to achieve this goal, while the UAE, Qatar and Oman are also using economic tools to exercise pressure, but not necessarily with the ultimate aim of ridding Syria of the al-Assad regime.
Regional political implications
The Arab riots, which have spread to the Gulf, have opened up a new front in the already fierce rivalry between Sunnis and Shiites and, more particularly, between Sunnis of Saudi Arabia and Shiites of Iran. The first test of this was in Bahrain, where several anti-government protests from February to September were repressed by the police and army. Mainly inhabited by Shiites, like Iran, Bahrain (the government estimates that about 55% of the total population belong to this branch of Islam, while the UNDP Arab Human Development Report puts the figure at least at 70%) has nevertheless been dominated for two centuries by the Sunni al-Khalifa family, which is related to the House of Saud. Consequently the situation in the sultanate appears to be much more than simple protest against the regime itself. The Saudi decision to send troops to Manama, and the endorsement of this action by the GCC (Kuwait and the UAE voted in favor), has allowed the al-Khalifa monarchy to perpetuate its power. However, this step ran the obvious risk of setting off a “cold war” within the Arab-Islamic world. It is no coincidence then that the regime in Tehran fiercely disapproved of the decision to send 1,000 Saudi troops from the GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force to Bahrain to help the Bahraini regime stifle unrest.
As often happens, the interests of Saudi Arabia conflict with those of the United States in the region at present. Despite its growing loss of influence in the Gulf, the U.S. has manage to maintain strategic facilities in Bahrain (the 5th Fleet base), a large air base in Qatar and a military presence in Kuwait, which enables America to control the Persian Gulf south of Iraq and ensure the safe passage of Saudi ships and oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, flanked by Oman and Iran. For Washington, the Gulf monarchies are of high strategic value and should not fall under the influence or control of Tehran. In fact, the GCC was founded precisely as a result of the fear of Iran.
The organization has long focused on internal economic cooperation, but in recent years, which have seen a gradual increase in Iran’s regional influence, the U.S. has encouraged regional players to consider the military option as a better way of countering the common perceived threat of the Islamic Republic. However, this cult of collective fear appears to have recently been refocused on Syria, with its unfolding political and security turmoil.
If the current crisis in Syria is not quickly resolved, it is possible then that an Iranian threat would become actually even more real. It is quite reasonable to assume that the GCC is positioning itself to take concerted action on the part of all its members in this eventuality. Other countries which might be involved directly in such a political conflict include neighboring states such as Jordan, which was recently invited, along with Morocco, to join the Council, and Turkey, an increasingly influential state in the Gulf. A change of leadership in Syria would mean a political defeat for Iran and its possible loss of influence on the shores of the East Mediterranean and in the Levant.
The GCC’s channels of influence
Unlike in Libya, the apparent humanitarian issue in Syria seems to be of grave concern to the international community. The GCC thinks, therefore, that it can influence the Syrian regime by working on the widespread web of vested interests which keep alive the Alawite clans of al-Assad. The Sunni sheiks of the Arabian Peninsula know that they can exert some pressure on Syria’s Sunni elite, which controls the most important economic sectors of the country and is hand in glove with the Alawite clan. The latter comes from the Shiite minority (about13% of the Syrian population) and is strongly linked with the al-Assad clan, which controls the country’s political and military resources. In the midterm, if some economic and financial support is not provided to Damascus, it is reasonable to assume that the political capacity of the clan in power will reduce quickly in the light of demographic realities. It is no coincidence that the UN, the United States, France and Germany are now planning to tighten economic sanctions against Syria. Already the European Union has imposed an embargo on imports of Syrian oil (about 95% of this is destined for the European market, according to the Syrian Petroleum Company, the leading national oil producer). However, these sanctions have been temporarily delayed and will only come into force in mid-November, partly due to Italy’s request to do so. Rome imports more than one third of the approximately 150,000 barrels of oil shipped daily from Damascus, and Italian firms have signed supply contracts scheduled to expire on 30 November.
The intentions of Saudi Arabia and the GCC, then, are one and the same: both seek to economically blackmail Syria and thus weaken it politically. This will be accomplished by applying a two-pronged strategy: isolating it from its traditional political partners (Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip), and then establishing a regional compact among the neighboring states which would counter Damascus. This would be a form of political diplomacy combined with rich economic incentives, such as that used in Yemen with President Saleh. He eventually had no choice but to “flee’ to Saudi Arabia to ensure a significant political transition for his country. It is very likely that the same kind of initiative might work in Syria, given its poor economic situation and the fact that it is becoming politically isolated.
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The GCCl has not yet outlined a common and clear-cut strategy towards Syria but has allowed member countries to take individual actions designed to apply economic pressure. For some of these members – including the influential Shiite member states – these tools are a means of pressuring al-Assad to leave office, while for other members, these instruments are used simply to convince the Syrian president to adopt a more democratic system. If, however, the hopes and expectations of the Gulf states are disregarded, it must be assumed that a more concerted and focused effort will be made to assert their position, as they did in Bahrain. In doing so, however, Arab leaders should consider all the possible consequences, especially in terms of their relations with Iran. The lever of economic pressure seems to be the most desirable one available, as it will not only address the grievances of some sections of the Syrian population, but also prevent the escalation of a more serious conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Richard Rousseau is Associate Professor and Chairman of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan and a contributor to Global Brief, World Affairs in the 21st Century (www.globalbrief.ca) and The Jamestown Foundation.