The recent SecDef11 Conference in Brussels saw presenters and participants exchange a number of suggestions about how intelligence, law enforcement and other information could or should be shared with law enforcement and intelligence partners throughout the EU and beyond. There was close to unanimous agreement that such sharing should take place, but in better and more efficient ways than before.
Yet the rub, for many in the room, was the trust factor: could the person given the information be trusted to act properly, i.e., in accordance with the law and for good purposes? For others, the nubs of the problem were the legal hurdles that needed to be overcome to obtain or provide the information.
From my own experience with EU, European and international intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and on behalf of some in law enforcement, I believe that international information sharing will help to develop new and existing relations. It’s in our collective security interests to share more information of better quality and in better ways. It would enable local or national law enforcement teams to catch and prosecute wrongdoers before problems spread to other nations, or even across the world.
There are a series of fixes that I believe are necessary to address the above goals and associated problems. First, relevant actors (especially those in intelligence communities) need to put a stop to unnecessarily restrictive interpretations of their own rules and laws. Applicable laws must be complied with, but interpretation of the laws should not bring about absurd or impossible standards or results.
Senior policy-makers and those charged with sharing information need better to balance the laudable goals of preserving a country’s national security. More care should be taken to develop and maintain international partnerships, as fruitful relations will increase security.
Overly restrictive interpretations of one’s own internal security rules and needs (e.g., the need to protect sources, methods and information), and misplaced fears of being wrongfully accused of treading on someone’s legal rights, have at times hampered international law enforcement’s ability to obtain information and perform its job. I neither condone a kick-down the door, “cowboy” approach to interpreting internal rules and laws, nor the too narrowly drawn and overly cautious approach by numerous countries and agencies. In short, a number of countries and agencies need to develop and practice a more reasonable approach to interpreting their own rules for disclosure.
Of course, every country needs to protect certain information, sources and methods of intelligence gathering. But if intelligence and law enforcement services only hold onto information because of their “rules” and a preservation of self-interests, then surely this becomes short-sighted? It’s hardly responsible for a country to hoard its own intelligence and allow its criminals to continue their crimes abroad. If a specific piece of information, source or method is needed to prove a case and prosecute a criminal, it should be made available to law enforcement teams in any country where the criminal may strike. I’m sure that adequate provisions can be made to safeguard key sources, methods, and information.
The second fix is that rules for formulating requests and responses to requests should be clearer and more uniform. The odd patchwork of rules and laws to be navigated, offices to be consulted and results that can be obtained have caused a great deal of confusion. As someone put it at the SecDef11 Conference (as well as the earlier published SecDef 2011 report), “There are around 27 different sets of rules and regulations” to be consulted in order to get information – and that’s just for the EU.
The rules must therefore be simplified and the process streamlined to give a quicker response time. The rules and practices have to be clear enough so that law enforcement personnel from a foreign country know what they can expect in the way of co-operation, how to process requests and when information can reasonably be expected to arrive. Those sending information also have to know what they can send and in what timeframe, along with other associated responsibilities. Several speakers at the SecDef 2011 Conference noted that responses to requests for information have to be “swift” and that those who receive requests should have an “open mind” about what is being asked. I would also add that agencies receiving requests should be consistent and thorough in their responses. Consistency of form and content would also go a long way towards speeding this process along. Without clarity and uniformity, law enforcement teams will waste valuable time, resources and manpower, ultimately leaving crimes unsolved and criminals uncaught for longer.
Thirdly, written policy and various laws (and the underlying rationale for them) need to change to be more supportive of information sharing. The Director of Spanish Intelligence partially addressed the topic at the SecDef11 Conference, indicating that those in the intelligence field need to “get acquainted, get ready and get joined.” The Director was firm in his position that countries around the world need to stop looking inwards as threats become increasingly global.
I would go one better and suggest that policy must be put in place that encourages intelligence and law enforcement teams to share information. Decision-makers need to convey clearly the notion that sharing is expected. They need to be proactive in their discussions on this subject, so that those below them – the implementers of policy – will act with gusto.
Fourth is the need to prepare for sharing information. A country might begin by developing a domestic network of prosecution, law enforcement and intelligence personnel, designed to work together efficiently. Thereafter, a network should be developed to share and receive information internationally.
As for the training of the network personnel, they could be trained in what, how and when to share information and could be encouraged to attend meetings with foreign institution members to develop bonds of trust. Training should also incorporate ways to think dynamically, going beyond the traditional modes of sharing and beyond traditional types of information shared. Intelligence and law enforcement teams should be adept enough to know if something would be of assistance to a foreign country’s security, and they should be encouraged to act on their own initiative. Training also might emphasise early collaboration with foreign authorities. This would not only enable foreign countries to assist in case investigations more quickly, but would also prevent the spread of related criminal attacks abroad.
The fifth fix is to ensure that sharing is not predicated solely upon being an EU member, or even on the basis of personal relationships. Certain countries appear to predicate the amount and type of information shared on where the request comes from, who the requesting party is, whether they’ve done business before and what kind of business has been done. The speed of responding to and processing requests has often been equally affected by personal relationships or the country propounding the request.
Personal contacts between intelligence and law enforcement agencies are a great thing, and there is no doubt that offices run by human beings who know one another co-operate better. Yet co-operation based on changeable human relationships is clearly not a sustainable, long-term solution. I recount with sadness the passing of a well-respected, well-connected Police Inspector from Bosnia and Herzegovina who had special connections to certain countries within the EU. When he passed away, his unit and the police force also suffered the loss of his international connections. This kind of situation has to be avoided in the future; criminals shouldn’t benefit because a point of contact between law enforcement teams is no longer available. It’s crucial that institutions and agencies learn to put faith in their foreign counterparts as a whole, and not just in individual employees.
Private companies, contractors and service providers should also be encouraged to play their parts. Working within the law, companies should not hesitate to report any suspicious activity by their customers, both domestic and abroad.
But how does one build trust and ensure that more information of better quality is shared? One speaker at the SecDef Conference, an Advisor on International Security at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), suggested first building it in areas where the information shared would not be so sensitive or controversial. At first only sharing medical or technical information would incrementally build a stronger relationship of trust. With regard to law enforcement, information about more general criminal activity – the transportation of illicit cargo, the travel of sought-after suspects and witness residence information – could be shared. Trust could also be built by processing basic informational requests about persons, backgrounds, etc., and also open-source materials.
With each successful transfer of information, more trust is established. Additional contacts within institutions and agencies should then be brought in to conduct requests for information sharing operations. This will then build trust between institutions, as opposed to simply between individuals.
The sixth important feature of better information sharing is feedback. Work should be discussed, results evaluated and consequences should exist. People who prepare requests and respond to them should be able to discuss their work with one another, ascertaining whether the information received was adequate and arrived promptly. Feedback of this kind would also contribute to the relationship of trust between international agencies and governments.
There could also be incentives for employees who effectively share information that leads to the arrest or prosecution of wrongdoers. Conversely, employees who do not share crucial information at the right time or in the correct way, resulting in (foreseeable) harm to the public, could be reprehended. Incentives for positive work and consequences for bad work could be agreed ahead of time, though of course there could be country-specific sensitivities and politics to bear in mind.
Finally, it is crucial that non-EU countries are not forgotten when it comes to information sharing. I have noted on various occasions that non-EU countries have been pushed to the wayside when trying to access the best quality information.
For example, a number of experts claim that the Balkans are the base of organized crime and terrorist outfits whose activities stretch far beyond the borders of the Balkan states. Some have reported an upsurge in the amount of terrorist-oriented electronic media being translated into Serbo-Croatian or Albanian by these groups, while others have indicated that a number of organized crime gangs use the region’s local languages to conduct their business. Infiltrating these organized crime and terrorist organizations (i.e., finding usable informants that can actually penetrate and gain the confidence of these groups) and tracking the movements of people and contraband in non-EU countries are daunting tasks for any country to take on. Balkan Mafia members and potential terrorists are becoming much more sophisticated in their techniques, using the same kinds of equipment and technology as law enforcement and intelligence organizations. It is therefore becoming increasingly difficult for single nations to keep track of these criminals’ movements and actions. Thus it seems foolish not to bring the Balkans’ law enforcement and intelligence teams fully up to speed with the outside world. The outside world would also surely benefit from full, candid briefings from the Balkans.
In the case of religious community connections to authorities, liaisons between police and religious community leaders might help to dispel the myth that law enforcement is “out to get” a particular religion or practitioner and also dispel the myth those in faith are not doing enough to point out real culprits. The development of contact or liaison points between law enforcement and persons in religious communities would go a long way towards encouraging each side to understand the other better, and ensure that each side is aware of the sensitivities involved in these situations. Development of the aforementioned contact points will also likely provide law enforcement and intelligence communities with greater insight into religious communities, their practices, etc., without unduly or unfairly burdening, harassing, or investigating them. These things could work not only within a country to aid community relations, but also across countries.
As many in the SecDef11 Conference agreed, we now live in a very connected world. Threats can become real in an instant and such things are no longer confined to one’s own country or region.
As global, political and economic problems continue – simple frustrations with making an honest living and paying the bills – societies continue to be vulnerable to the calls of criminal organizations and terrorist groups. The degrees of exposure may differ, but we’re all potentially subject to both domestic and foreign threats. We may think that those within close proximity of some of the alleged base or transit countries might be more susceptible to immediate threats, but such is not always the case. We have seen organized criminals and terrorists come from all over, so it is in our collective interests to share more information in better ways, enabling decision-makers to assess threats and make assertive, informed decisions. The foregoing list of ideas to improve speed, quality and certainty of information sharing is not exhaustive, but it is a starting place for improved sharing in the future.
Drew G. Engel is a Special Advisor to the Special Department for Organized Crime at the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina.