Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak predicted last week that the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria would collapse within a few weeks. Assuredly, this and other such predictions are not that highly regarded, or sought out, by the Assad regime. The bloodshed continues on the ground, as the Syrian Free Army, and other pro-democratic guerrilla groups, continue to attack the government and its enforcers. Economic sanctions imposed by the Arab League will only take effect on December 27, and they are not likely to be particularly effective measures. Economists expect that the Syrian economy will retract considerably in 2012. The economic horizon is already bleak, as a result of the existing European Union (EU) sanctions and the virtual collapse of the tourism sector.
Nevertheless, most observers are still making bold analyses, predicting with great certainty the imminent collapse of the Assad dynasty. These predictions have been channeled into the mass media since as far back as April, but the dictator remains in place. It is possible that he may still be around for quite some time, as the most important factors and support mechanisms that have so far kept Assad in power are still in place.
The Assad regime, despite the sanctions, is not totally cut off from the outside world and as politically isolated as many believe. Most importantly, its strategic partner, Iran, is still staunchly standing beside it. The mullahs have no plans to abandon their ally, and since the outset of hostilities the Iranians have provided material support, advice and, perhaps, military means to help Assad combat the anti-government forces. This patronage has recently been confirmed publicly by many observers and there is no sign of it decreasing any time soon.
Even big players such as Russia and China are still on the proverbial battlefield. Their collective support, expressed through stonewalling any U.S. attempts to provoke a UN Security Council response to the bloodshed in Syria, has so far been effective. Syria also has many friends in the Arab world. The Maliki government in Iraq has become a close ally and trading partner - in accordance with its orientation towards Iran, Baghdad voted against the sanctions targeted against Damascus at the UN. Of course, Hezbollah’s future in Lebanon is contingent on the continued survival of the Assad regime. It can only maintain its own strategic position if Assad is successful in quelling the Syrian opposition. Overall, the Assad clan and network of patronage are not being forced out in the cold in this unfolding ordeal.
Furthermore, the unconvincing “protocol” adopted by the Arab League, ostensibly aimed at addressing the Syrian crisis, is mainly a distraction undertaken to prevent a more determined international response. Arabs will take all necessary means to prevent another Western military intervention in the heart of the Arab world. The Arab League’s plan seeks to circumvent this by creating the semblance of an alternative Arab roadmap for reform in Syria. Meanwhile, members of the organization have been bogged down in endless verbal games, with lots of criticism and recriminations flying around over the heated issue of Arab observers in Syria.
Even though Assad has agreed to Arab observers monitoring the unfolding situation on the ground, this will not make any noticeable difference for the vast majority of the population. Leaving the fate of Syria in the hands of the Arab League equates to nothing more than allowing Assad to cling onto power.
The large and increasing number of troops deserting the Syrian Free Army has not so far damaged the determination Assad’s security forces. The Syrian Army has at its disposal vast and efficient instruments of repression, including four large and brutal security services and a cluster of “Shabiha” fighters who belong to the minority Alawi sect, as do the Assad family. Conversely, the opposition remains divided and hesitant and has no concerted strategy to follow. Its military capabilities, in spite of its ostentatious determination, are of a considerably lesser significance than are those available to the dictator.
Ultimately, political power stems from holding the higher ground with superior military and security forces. It is clear that the Syrian opposition lacks the capability to do this; it is not positioned to either seize power or hold it for long. The fractured opposition also remains split along ideological lines. For instance, the main political and armed wings have different perspectives about the best tactics to use, while the Syrian National Council’s authority is rejected by a considerable number of the smaller political groups.
The many reports foretelling the pending collapse of Assad are more the product of wishful thinking than an analysis of the facts on the ground. If the current repression continues one can easily envisage a bloody and stalemated civil war being a more likely outcome in Syria, whose conclusion remains uncertain. However, as has been proved in other countries facing similar turmoil, the creation of a buffer zone in the northern part of Syria, a no-fly or demilitarized zone, backed by an international force, could be the move most likely to change the dynamics of the situation.
Those favoring a regime change should consider sponsoring ideological and military training for the opposition, which needs a coherent political and military strategy if it seriously wants to challenge Assad’s ingrained dictatorship. Signs of a well-organized and coordinated assault on the seat of power are, however, not on the horizon. Consequently Assad is likely to survive for some time yet, at least into the immediate future, unless the rules of the game are considerably altered and direct support from external actors is forthcoming.
Richard Rousseau is Associate Professor and Chairman of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan and a contributor to Global Brief, World Affairs in the 21st Century (www.globalbrief.ca) and the Jamestown Foundation.