Throughout the last decades the US was the prime target for Arab anger concerning external forces meddling in Middle East affairs. The decline of US soft power in the Middle East had direct implications on the political and strategic choices of the US administration. One year after the start of the Arab awakening, even after US involvement in the ouster of Mubarak in Egypt and military intervention against Kaddafi in Libya, the basic negative perceptions on US foreign policy in the region hasn’t change dramatically. As a survey conducted by the Brooking Institute and Maryland University, made public in November 2011 shows the US, despite some improvements in favorability around the region, still ranks low in the region among other world powers.      

While the US was struggling with the huge political burdens it took on itself with the war on terror and the Iraqi war, emerging powers such as Russia and especially China, with their pragmatic approach focusing on economic opportunities seemed to be gaining influence in the region. Both of these powers deepened their cooperation especially with the “rejectionist” camp in the region, foremost Iran, although considerable tensions and distrust are present as well especially in the Russia – Iran relations.

The developments of the “Arab Awakening”, similarly as to the United States and the EU, has bought new challenges for these powers, as the case of Libya proved. The Libyan civil war with the NATO intervention hasn’t turned out in the end the way Moscow and Beijing would of thought. Although it is not the case that the new rulers of Tripoli are determined to be a staunch ally of the West after NATO’s military engagement on their side, Russia and China will face probably more difficult challenges to build close ties with them. Moscow’s and Beijing’s objection of the intervention will likely not disappear from the memories of new Libyan leaders and large proportions of the Libyan population who supported the Gaddafi - regime’s demise.           

A similar story is at play in Syria now, where the regime primarily backed by Iran and Russia is trying to crush the opposition with increasing brutality. The Syrian internal conflict is just one episode of the region wide sunni – shia competition for power ranging from Lebanon to the Gulf, although in each case the front lines and the coalitions are always more complicated on the ground than it is sometimes perceived from the outside. Nevertheless, after the recent UN Security Council vote on Syria, it has become clear not just to the Syrian opposition, but to the Arab  masses in the whole region seeking for change that which major power is on who’s side of that conflict.

The concerted effort of key Western powers following the Arab League in increasing gradually the pressure on Assad has been the most viable option. As numerous military experts have pointed out, a Libya – like military operation would have tremendous risks concerning the execution and the outcome. Syria’s population is much bigger, the army is much more capable, supplying the regime from Russia or Iran is much more easy to organize, and probably most importantly, the opposition is much more fragmented and disorganized then it was in the case of Libya. Not to mention the low appetite in NATO countries for another risky military intervention. A sustained and concerted effort by the Arab League, Turkey and the West to isolate the regime politically and economically would sooner or later likely force Assad to back down, although this outcome clearly does not solve the current serious humanitarian crisis posed by the regime’s brutality.

Meanwhile Russia is on the defense after its veto at the UN last week, as a face-saving measure trying to pressure Assad to cease violence and make some concessions to open ways for talks. But events on the ground have long passed the point for an easy political solution, since the regime and its leaders perceive they are fighting for their existential survival. Similarly as the challenge the US had to face in Bahrain in the spring of 2011, Russia is not in a position to put enough pressure on Assad without risking its strategic objective of keeping the regime alive, and Assad clearly is in aware of that. Not to mention Russia does not have the tools needed to consolidate a post-conflict Syria. Same for China, although an emerging player in the power-politics of the Gulf as a major energy importer, it simply does not have the political influence, the resources and the capabilities to be a determining factor in internal Arab political conflicts, and it clearly does not want to be seen meddling in Middle Eastern affaires in the spotlight, as to uphold the perception of a neutral, pragmatic power who is open for business with everyone.

The Syrian crisis described above highlights a very likely future of Middle East geopolitics. With American influence weakened in the last decade accompanied by the US “pivot” to the Pacific, the Europeans without hard power in no position to significantly determine the balance of power, and new emerging powers still lacking enough hard power and soft power to be decisive players, the politics of the region will be much more so determined by the actors within the region then in the past. Furthermore, unpredictability will be even more so a major feature of the political dynamics of the region than the past decades as a consequence of the “Arab Awakening”. Democratization brings more and more political players to the scene in each country with concurring agendas, while the new leaders in power will face extreme economic and social challenges, making their long term popular support vulnerable.  

Europeans and the US have to adjust their policies to this new reality of the Middle East, which should mean an opening to emerging political forces, looking for ways in maximizing the opportunities and minimizing the risks. The first one means approaching the Islamist political forces. The second one includes trying to detach those Islamist groups which seem to move into a moderate direction and are open for dialogue from those forces, which are clearly interested in deepening the divisions between Arab countries and the West. The third one means not going into or supporting unpredictable military adventures which would make the previous two objectives almost impossible.