Dealing with Iran’s nuclear programme is undoubtedly the most critical strategic question in the proliferation field and a very important issue on today’s international security agenda. The regional security problem is in reality not limited to the nuclear issue, but rather this is perceived to be the case by Western countries, and probably by some of Iran’s neighbours, as being the most pressing security concern.

Even if one disagrees with the more dire predictions about the impact of Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability for regional and international security, scenarios range between bad and worse and there is an urgent need to resolve the issue. However, there appears to be very limited scope for progress in negotiations about the ‘nuclear file’ and we are slowly sliding towards a military conflict with potentially disastrous consequences.

Is there a way out of this impasse? If one accepts that the nuclear issue is very important but not the only or the central issue in the relationship between Iran and the West, then the objective should be the overall improvement of relations, with resolution of the nuclear issue being one of the results of the rapprochement, not a precondition. Military action must be viewed as a component of a comprehensive strategy rather than a stand-alone option for dealing with Iran’s nuclear programme. Furthermore, sanctions should continue to be used as a tool of pressure against Iran, albeit not as the central element of the West’s strategy. The critical element should be engagement.

Christoph Bertram and several other scholars have been arguing that a nuclear issue-focused strategy and the ‘demonization’ of Iran have inflated the value of these capabilities, and strengthened the hardliners. The West, it is argued, should ‘’return to a sense of proportion’’ and ‘’re-enlarge the zoom’’ of its relations with Iran, which is too important for the West to be reduced to the nuclear issue. Other issues and problems in relations with Tehran should come into the equation in a ‘grand strategic bargain’ to resolve all outstanding questions. A key question, therefore, is ‘’what are the topics that should be discussed’’? What are Iran’s priorities and expected gains from such comprehensive negotiations with the U.S. and Europe?

Iran does not want to be seen as a pariah state and which is accordingly diplomatically and economically isolated. It is also argued that in order to solidify recent strategic gains, Iran needs to reach a compromise with the U.S., as well as its Arab neighbours. Therefore, key issues on the Iranian agenda would probably include the re-establishment of diplomatic links, which would offer much-sought legitimacy to the regime, the normalisation of relations with the U.S. and the EU, acknowledgement of Iran’s regional role (although this would almost certainly cause strong reaction from Arab Sunni states, especially Saudi Arabia and should not be done at the expense of other countries), some type of guarantees for regime survival, and access to Western (mainly European) sources of investment.

The willingness of the West to engage Iran into diplomatic talks across the board, without any preconditions, should be expressed. Common interests and opportunities should clearly be presented. The emphasis should be placed on the possible gains for all sides involved. At the same time, a number of ‘red lines’ should be clearly defined (admittedly, not an easy exercise) and presented to the other side, as well as the possible costs of the continued confrontation, including the cost of missed opportunities.

Of course, even if Western governments are willing to engage into such a unilateral diplomatic exercise, it will not be easy to sustain the process in the absence of a positive Iranian reaction, which may not be immediately forthcoming given that Iran’s domestic political scene is extremely complex, and actors have multiple agendas. Several centres of power are involved in the design and execution of Iranian foreign and military policy, whereas consensual style and the opaque nature of the decision-making process complicate the situation even further. And time will also be a critical factor.

On the nuclear issue, one should explore the merits of the idea put forward by Gareth Evans who proposed the abandonment of the ‘zero enrichment’ goal in favour of a ‘delayed limited enrichment’, with the wider international community explicitly accepting that Iran can enrich uranium domestically for peaceful nuclear energy purposes. In return, Iran would agree to phasing in that enrichment programme over an extended period of years, with major limitations on its initial size and scope, and a highly intrusive inspections regime (the proposal for the creation of a regional/multinational enrichment centre should be re-introduced). Thus, the Iranian regime would be able to both claim to its domestic audience that it did not wield to U.S. pressure, while simultaneously appearing as a responsible power on the international scene.

Beyond resolving the nuclear impasse, there is a need to address the regional security vacuum and create a new comprehensive regional security system in the Gulf region. A number of confidence-building measures could be discussed such as:

·         a regional security forum, with annual meetings for heads of states, foreign, defence, finance and interior ministers;

·         prior notification of and exchange of observers in exercises;

·         joint exercises and arrangements for disaster relief in the case of natural and man-made disasters;

·         Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) for the prevention of incidents between naval and air forces respectively;

·         joint Search and Rescue (SAR) arrangements;

·         cooperation regarding trafficking, drug-trade, and border security issues.

Europe’s experience with similar arrangements, although in a quite different context, could be useful in the early phases of discussions for a regional security system. In this context, it has also been suggested that, as there are strong local and regional dynamics, Gulf states should begin to take ownership of the regional security process and put forward local initiatives.

The international community’s negotiating strategy should consist of a skilful synthesis of readiness to accommodate Iran’s legitimate concerns and integrate this important country into an inclusive regional security system, accompanied by concrete incentives, together with reasonable timetables and a clear understanding of the possible consequences for Tehran if it continues its spoiling actions in the Gulf region and the wider Middle East.

Thanos Dokos is the Director-General of the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) in Athens. thanosdokos@eliamep.gr