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The European Security Strategy is an important step in establishing the EU’s broad strategic agenda, and it has effectively identified the most significant security threats. But Ari Vatanen MEP argues that, unless the EU develops concrete proposals that can turn those words into action, then Europe is destined to remain ineffective in the field of global security
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Perhaps the core historical raison d'être for the creation of the EU was to ensure that European countries never again went to war. But while European integration has ushered in an unprecedented period of peace on our continent, large parts of the rest of the world are not nearly so peaceful. Clearly, the EU has the capacity to play a major role in bringing peace to other regions of the globe. And, in the five years since the European Security Strategy was drafted, the need for the EU to play its part in tackling the many threats facing global security has become increasingly urgent. But, to be effective, the EU must first develop the political will to take on that burden.
Certainly, the 2003 European Security Strategy was an important step in setting the broad strategic guidelines for the EU's global role. But the time has come to turn those words into action. Unfortunately, the update of the strategy that was adopted by the European Council in December 2008 – whilst effectively listing the essential objectives and acknowledging new emerging concerns – fails to provide the necessary strategic direction for practically realising the already ambitious objectives in the original paper.
Undoubtedly, the updated strategy effectively reflects the evolution of the wider security context since 2003. It does, for example, rightly highlight the growing threat from the Iranian nuclear programme, it emphasises the need to improve Europe’s energy security following recent gas crises, and it includes the new threat of maritime piracy. But making the EU a credible player on the world stage does not depend on the number of difficult security issues that can be identified. Rather, the EU’s global influence will reflect how, with what instruments, and to what extent, it can practically address those issues. So what Europe needs is not a new strategy, but clarification on just how to achieve a set of objectives that are crucial to Europe’s common security concerns. In this respect, however, the strategy update offers few insights.
The basic concept underpinning the European Security Strategy is that, for the EU to be a credible player on the global stage, it is necessary to be effective in three core areas. First, the EU must be domestically effective, by improving its own military capabilities. Second, the EU needs to be influential within its own immediate regional sphere, by developing closer ties with neighbouring non-EU states. And third, it needs to be internationally effectively at a global level, through the promotion of multilateralism. Certainly, much has been achieved since 2003 on all three of these objectives. But the updated strategy still recognises that “implementation remains work in progress”.
But many obstacles to implementation remain. At the domestic level, for instance, the EU continues to lack the military capabilities to be truly globally effective. Whilst EU member states spend, in total, more than €200bn on defence each year, Europe-wide coordination of these resources remains weak – which leads to inefficiency. In fact, and despite possessing a total of 2m trained soldiers, which is more than in the U.S., the overwhelming majority of these troops cannot be deployed beyond national borders. There is also a severe shortage of the type of military equipment that is most effective for today’s operational needs. A shortage of helicopters, for example, led to last year’s EU mission to protect refugees in eastern Chad being delayed. Unfortunately, beyond pointing out in general terms that efforts should be stepped-up to improve the EU’s capabilities, the updated strategy has few concrete proposals for tackling this problem.
A good first step here would be the production a European White Paper on Security and Defence – the European Parliament has already requested the Council to do this. That White Paper is essential in defining a clear strategy for Europe’s defence resources and the use to which they should be put. It would need to set clear objectives, dealing with such issues as how many troops Europe should commit to crisis management missions, or how many should be set aside for defence.
In order ensure that the EU can be effective when reacting to a crisis situation, and practically effective when deploying forces on the ground, the update recognises the need for clearly defined command structures and headquarters capabilities. But what is practically needed here is the creation of an EU operational headquarters (OHQ), based in Brussels, that could call upon those standing national forces which have already been made available by the member states for EU operations (EU battle groups). Such a permanent OHQ would increase reactivity capacity by avoiding the long process of coordination that must be pursued at present before a European Security & Defence Policy (ESDP) mission can be launched. More importantly it would end the burdensome task of establishing ad hoc command structures from scratch each time an EU operation takes place.
But quite apart from the importance of capabilities, an even more important issue that has yet to be addressed in detail by the strategy is the fundamental matter of the criteria for determining whether an ESDP mission should be launched. In this context, the principle of "responsibility to protect" which is cited in the document – although not specifically linked to launching ESDP operations – could form the basis for a set of precise future intervention criteria. The principle, endorsed by the UN Security Council in 2006, places the protection of human life above that of the non-violability of state sovereignty as a clear justification for humanitarian intervention.
Ultimately, however, the biggest obstacle to achieving the EU's international aim of promoting peace and reducing human suffering is a lack of political will from member states. This undermines both the essential modernisation and rationalisation of member states' armed forces, which remain insulated from each other, and the capacity for the EU to be globally effective. The mechanism within the Lisbon treaty for permanent structure cooperation could, however, offer a way forward for making progress with the security strategy. Specifically, it could allow those member states that are most willing to pursue a coordinated EU defence strategy to do so without being held back by those that are more cautious.
Additionally, the EU’s attempts to build relations with neighbouring non-EU states also needs more focus. The update does stress the importance of the European Neighbourhood Policy as a means of strengthening bilateral relations with countries surrounding the EU. And the new Eastern Partnership has been designed to provide a more focused framework for dealing with the EU’s eastern European neighbours, while also promoting regional stability. But this project will not make a significant impression on countries with strong European aspirations, such as Ukraine or Moldova, unless it is pursed with a clearer European-focused agenda.
To be successful within its own regional sphere, the EU must acknowledge that some countries possess neither the desire nor the capacity to join the EU. The present approach, however, effectively treats all neighbouring states equally. The solution could be to design a framework with clearer benchmarks. And, for those eastern countries with clear European aspirations, the EU could pursue a policy with a European perspective – perhaps modelled on the Stabilisation and Association Process for the western Balkans.
Partnerships for effective multilateralism represent the third area identified in the original security strategy. But while NATO remains at the core of the Europe’s collective defence, the document fails to provide any guidance on how the EU and NATO could improve their often awkward attempts at cooperation. This looks especially relevant given that 94% of the EU’s population live in NATO member countries. Additionally, and given that NATO has become engaged in crisis management missions along with the EU, the problem of who intervenes where, and how that intervention should be carried out in order to avoid overlap, also need to be addressed.
This point would be best tackled on the basis of a practical division of labour, with NATO assuming responsibility for larger-scale military operations and the EU taking on smaller missions in which the U.S. either cannot, or does not wish, to become engaged. In order to better implement such an EU-NATO partnership it also makes sense to establish systematic contacts between the secretary generals of NATO and the EU Council – as proposed by the French government. This would help avoid confusion when the EU and NATO find themselves operating side by side in different missions, but working towards the same common goal. The full reintegration of France into the alliance will also increase the geographic overlap between EU and NATO, possibly leading to increased calls to develop a more effective relationship between the two organisations.
In conclusion, then, the challenge facing the European Security Strategy is not so much about identifying newly emerging threats. Rather, it is to recognise that Europe must begin to think seriously about the measures that must be pursued in order to achieve the already ambitious objectives set out in the original strategy document. Only by putting forward concrete proposals, which turn words into action, can the EU become a truly global strategic force. This will require strong political direction and European leaders must accept that, only though a common effort, can the EU effectively discharge its responsibilities for global security. Crucially, however, without the means to pursue the objectives set out in the European Security Strategy, the EU will remain nothing but a barking dog with no teeth.
Ari Vatanen was a member of the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Relations. He was the rapporteur of a report on the role of NATO in the security architecture of the EU (January 2009).
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The fourteenth edition of Europe's World is out. We feel it's fair to say that few if any publications in the field of international relations and policy debate have grown as fast or widened their scope so remarkably as Europe's World. Table of contents of Issue 14. The search is on for 'global governance' solutions to the world's economic and political problems. The trouble is, of course, that there's not much agreement across Europe or around the world on what sort of policy instruments, institutions and rules would open the way to a fairer international system serving the needs of North and South, East and West while avoiding the pitfalls that led to the global crisis. Read more |
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IS HOME-GROWN
TERRORISM A FAILURE
OF INTEGRATION
POLICIES OR
THE SYMPTOM OF
A WIDER CRISIS?
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