Jonathan Holslag, research fellow at the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (BICCS)
From the gleaming factory floors of Guangdong and the remote rural villages Hubei, to the outskirts of Lhasa and the dusty avenues of Urumqi, the Chinese government has found itself confronted with unprecedented anarchy. The recent pandemonium adds to the impression that in spite of its rapid economic growth, China remains a hollow power, that the Communist Party recipe for development has failed, and that even a collapse of the People’s Republic cannot be excluded. Yet, it is this weakness in particular that invigorates China’s pursuit of greatness. The world is likely to see an even bolder China, whose new nationalism in the long term can only be tempered by its success.
Harmonious development
How insurmountable their domestic problems might appear, juvenile powers need a certain degree of inequality, xenophobia, and trepidation to persist in their manifest destiny. It took United States for example more than 250 years to close the American frontier. During that period it had to surpass itself constantly to quell political fragmentation, to penetrate its vast territory with new economic arteries, and to curb resistance of those groups that felt excluded by its growing success. America’s European predecessors were no exception to this rule. As if nation building and industrialization ever were a matter of easy transition. Some people have to get rich and powerful first, and they will likely try to keep it that way.
The People’s Republic cannot escape from this pattern, but it is doing pretty well in managing the collateral damage of its growth. Certainly in comparison to its huge demographic burden and the fact that it is still in its take-off stage. Already at this early phase of its industrialization, Beijing is investing massively in narrowing the gap between the new affluent middle class and the poor. It is channelling its efforts for a stable society through what it calls a “harmonious development strategy”. Despite the unequal nature of growth, the challenge is to generate sustainable opportunities for the society as a whole.
New nationalism
It is easy to deride this strategy as mere propaganda, but in reality it reflects the political elite’s self-interest in maintaining stability without having to strain is means completely by creating a larger version of North Korea. It also represents the deep-seated fear of the majority of the Chinese people to slide into another revolutionary episode. Growing unrest is not seen as a failure of “harmonious development”, but as a threat to it that must be suppressed or neutralized with new nationalism. Around the clock, state media are broadcasting crippled victims of “Uighur extremism” or point at “foreign agitators” attempting to humiliate China by stirring ethnic rivalry. The Chinese government will grasp events like these to strengthen its position as guardian of national security and to legitimize repression. But on the other hand, it will undoubtedly step up its efforts to prevent resistance by bringing more prosperity to the various ethnic minorities in its periphery. Government think tanks are instructed to explore new options that would allow these groups to benefit more and faster.
The Party will embrace economic growth even more as a matter of national survival. Productivity remains a precondition for harmonious development. It is looking for modern industrial niches, high-tech, and advanced services to allow its rich coastal Provinces to release their traditional industries to their landlocked counterparts, and to move the development frontier westward. The Twelfth Five-Year Plan, to be launched next year, will likely try to consolidate this qualitative and geographical shift.
The quest for national unity will be translated into a stronger yearning for status at the international level. China does not foresee to replace America’s hegemony, but it wants to be respected as a great nation and a rising regional power with international interests. This implies first and foremost to convince neighbours of the common need for stability and that China’s rise brings nothing but mutual gains. From other developing countries it will expect sympathy, esteem and support for its development track. Western powers should concentrate on there own problems, refrain from criticism, and to keep their markets open. The baseline of China’s diplomacy remains to avoid confrontation, but disappointment will be met with stauncher resistance.
Response
The bolder China gets, the more tempting it will be to criticize the many flaws of its development. How ugly and repulsive China’s nationalism might be to most Westerners, a certain degree of realism and modesty is due. Such a rhetorical tit-for-tat game pushes Beijing even deeper into its trenches. China remains the most successful anti-poverty programme of the past centuries, and as long as it continues to develop, there is a good chance that the Party will increasingly identify its national guardianship with more enlightened objectives. This cannot be taken for granted and in any case it will cost time, a lot of time.
For now the best way to help China’s weak and repressed is to avoid that our own sociopolitical achievements lose lustre as a source of inspiration for the country's future reform. Many Chinese still find Europe’s welfare state an example, be it a distant one. Europe should express its concern and continue to interact with China on human rights issues, but keeping up the credibility of its own model will help much more than deriding China’s inescapable growing pains.
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