Summary
Russia negotiating without a clearly articulated position may lead to blocking at last minute, and collapsing the Copenhagen deal. Currently, the Russian position remains largely a “black-box”. At the highest level of the Russian administration there is little motivation to actively engage in the Copenhagen talks. Hence it is a challenge to foresee how Russia will act in the end-game at Copenhagen.
The current Russian position undermines the environmental integrity of the Copenhagen agreement: its target of a 10-15% reduction by 2020 will generate ‘a Copenhagen surplus’. The carry-over of Russia’s surplus allowances from the first commitment period could significantly undermine developed country reduction targets. In addition, the Russian position on forest sinks accounting would lead to more loopholes, and thus, further windfall emission allowances.
Other countries need to define an acceptable minimum contribution for Russia. For example, either the Kyoto surplus must be cancelled, or its Copenhagen cap must be tightened to prevent the generation of a further surplus.
Elements could be traded within the climate agreement in order to find a stronger balance. For example, maintaining the status of transition economies could be a high-stakes bargaining chip due to Russia’s desire to play a regional leadership role. ‘Soft swaps’ external to the agreement, for example, energy sector cooperation, could also be used.
How to deal with a scenario in which Russia blocks depends on how far it has moved from the current position. If Russia has strengthened its position, it may be appropriate to bargain using elements external to the Copenhagen agreement, for instance, relaxing visa regime or longer-term gas contracts with the EU.
Russian non-participation in the Copenhagen agreement could lead to exclusion of Moscow from global decision-making on climate issues, with consequences for the global energy market and future technology initiatives. This suggests that in the end-game Russia may shift position if presented with a united front.
In order to involve Russia in taking decisions on the crunch issues in Copenhagen, it is necessary for high level officials, e.g. President Medvedev, to participate. Other world leaders may need to extend the invitation.
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