COMMENTARY

Summer 2012

by Ian Lesser

Rob de Wijk suggests a series of likely geopolitical consequences flowing from Europe’s economic and political travails. From an American perspective, it is hard to disagree with his thoughtful analysis, although on a few points I would offer some additional thoughts.

It is almost certainly true that a troubled Europe will be a less obvious and effective partner for Washington, but the question of Europe’s geopolitical importance as seen from the U.S. will in the end depend on what happens in and around Europe. In recent decades, Americans have come to see Europe as a place of gentle trends and few shocks but this idea of a stable Europe can no longer be taken for granted. The European and American economies are so highly interdependent, especially in financial terms, that a protracted financial crisis and slow growth in Europe will be of critical concern to the U.S. In this sense, among others, what happens in Europe will still be very important to American interests.

It is certainly true that a troubled Europe will be a less attractive partner for the U.S. in foreign and security policy terms. But the relative decline of Europe and its near-abroad as a strategic theatre for the U.S. is nothing new, and has been underway for some time. The rise of Asia in economic and geopolitical terms is the real driver here, hence the fashionable notion of a “pivot” to Asia. This shift will be reinforced by a striking generational shift in American public attitudes. As the German Marshall Fund’s (GMF) most recent “Transatlantic Trends” survey notes, a majority of Americans now see Asia as more important than Europe to U.S. interests. Younger Americans are especially convinced of this new reality.

American disengagement from regional security concerns on Europe’s southern periphery certainly looks likely. Given demands elsewhere on the U.S., Europe will probably have to be the leading actor in day-to-day crisis management from North Africa to the Levant, and has been true in the Balkans for some time. But this doesn’t mean that the U.S. will remain absent if the stakes are high enough, or as an enabling power in a demanding crisis, like Libya. It was not strictly accurate to say that the U.S. was unwilling to participate in the air campaign in Libya, its aircraft were engaged, and provided critical air refuelling and reconnaissance support throughout the military operation.

Rob de Wijk is undoubtedly right to suggest that the crisis will weaken Europe’s ability to shape its environment in foreign policy terms, and will weaken the EU’s capacity as a soft power. It has sometimes been observed that its own enlargement has been the EU’s most successful foreign policy undertaking. To the extent that Europe’s economic and political troubles cast a pall over the outlook for major new enlargements – Turkey being the leading case – while reducing enthusiasm for Europe as a model in the neighbourhood, and globally, Europe’s geopolitical position will weaken substantially. And, as de Wijk notes, new actors, above all China, will come to play a larger role in Europe and around the European neighbourhood. They will come as investors and trading partners, and it would be surprising if they do not acquire a geopolitical stake in the European space. It’s a phenomenon that is already visible in Mediterranean ports.

What are the counters to this vision of geopolitical weakness? A strategy of access to vital raw materials might be a useful hedge, but is hardly likely to transform the strategic outlook for Europe over the longer-term. I would argue for a shared new European and American grand strategy that seeks to enlarge the Atlantic partnership on practical issues of mutual concern, from energy and food security to global governance. We need to bring emerging actors like India and Brazil into the Euro-Atlantic equation.

Ian O. Lesser is Executive Director of the Transatlantic Center in Brussels of the German Marshall Fund of the U.S. ilesser@gmfus.org